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Abstract: Employing data on Indian banks for 1992-2012, the article examines the impact of macroprudential 
measures on bank performance. It finds that state-owned banks tend to have lower profitability and 
soundness than their private counterparts. Next, it tests whether such differentials between state-owned and 
private banks are driven by macroprudential measures; it finds strong support for this hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, countries have put a lot on emphasis on financial sector reforms as a means to improve 
the overall functioning of the sector. Such reforms have encompassed a significant gamut of measures, 
including lowering of statutory reserve requirements, deregulation of interest rates, introduction of 
measures relating to income recognition, loan classification and provisioning, allowing more liberal 
entry of foreign banks and diversifying the ownership base of state-owned banks. The evidence 
emanating from empirical research is admittedly mixed. One set of studies find that financial 
deregulation leads to an increase in the resilience and performance of the banking sector (Boyd and De 
Nicolo, 2005; Das and Ghosh, 2006; Yeyati and Micco, 2007), while others find that the net effect of 
financial deregulation on the banking sector to be negative (Keeley, 1990; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996; 
Wheelock and Wilson, 1999).  
The existing literature tends to look at each measure of prudential regulation measure in isolation, 
thereby ignoring the effect of these measures on bank performance. None of the studies take a holistic 
view on the joint effect of different policy dimensions of prudential regulation on bank performance. As 
Allen and Gale (2004) observe, since the aspects of performance, stability, efficiency and soundness of 
banks are inter-related, careful consideration of all important prudential measures is important for 
sound empirical analysis. 
In this context, the paper investigates how various measures of macroprudential regulation affect the 
performance of the banking sector. More specifically, we consider the impact of three major policy 
dimensions of macroprudential regulation – capital adequacy ratio, provisioning norms and loan 
classification requirements - on the performance of the Indian banking system. We employ four 
indicators on which to assess the impact: return on asset (RoA) as the profitability measure, net interest 
margin (NIM) as the measure of economic efficiency, Z-score as the measure of bank stability and 
finally, advances growth (Gr_Adv) as a measure of bank business.  
The paper combines several strands of literature. The first strand is the effect of macroprudential 
measures on bank performance. Second, the paper is related to the literature on the evolution of the 
Indian banking sector in the post-deregulation era and on the characterization of the state-owned 
banks in India (Banerjee et al., 2004; Berger et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010; Cole, 2011). Finally, this study 
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belongs to the literature which investigates the within-country effects of changes in regulation (Shrieves 
and Dahl, 1992; Ediz et al., 1998; Stolz, 2007) and to a wider literature which identifies the effects of 
regulations based on cross-country analysis (Murinde and Yaseen, 2006; Van Roy, 2008; Cosimano and 
Hakura, 2011).  
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. We follow up with the literature, the data and 
methods, and thereafter, a discussion of the results. The final section concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
A significant body of literature has examined the impact of deregulation on bank behavior. It is possible 
to broadly distinguish two strands of literature. The first is primarily theoretical in nature, while the 
second is more empirical in its scope.  
The theoretical literature has focused on the interrelationship among financial deregulation, market 
power and risk-taking by banks. Hellmann et al. (2001) contend that capital requirements alone may not 
be enough to curtail bank risk and additional requirements could be useful to reduce risk in a 
competitive environment. Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) suggest that the optimal bank capital 
structure trades off liquidity creation and bank distress.  
Empirical research into the above models report mixed findings. According to the first strand, the 
impact of financial deregulation is typically assessed either through a dummy variable (Salas and 
Saurina, 2003) or simply examining the behavior of banks during periods of financial deregulation (Das 
and Ghosh, 2006). The findings indicate that the impact of deregulation on bank behavior depends, 
among others, on the state of the banking system and differs significantly across bank ownership.  
The second strand of the literature focuses on the impact of financial deregulation on bank 
performance. Cross-country studies (Maudos and Pastor, 2001) report improvements in performance, 
post-financial deregulation. However, given the inherent difficulties inherent in cross-country 
comparisons, studies have also been conducted at the country-level. At the country level, studies have 
examined, among others, the performance of banks in the US (Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995; Wheelock 
and Wilson, 1999), Norway (Berg et al., 1992), Thailand (Leightner, 1997), Korea (Gilbert and Wilson, 
1998) and Taiwan (Shyu, 1998).  
These studies suffer from two major limitations. First, they focus on a catch-all measure, thereby 
ignoring the impact of specific policy dimensions of deregulation. Second, most studies examine the 
impact of financial deregulation on efficiency and productivity, neglecting other measures of bank 
performance, such as profitability and soundness. Partly as a response to these concerns, two sets of 
studies have emerged. The first examines the impact of specific regulatory reforms on various facets of 
bank performance. The second set examines the impact of financial deregulation on alternate measures 
of bank performance. 
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As regards the former, Kwan (2002) focused on the impact of interest rate financial deregulation in 
bank performance in Hong Kong. The study observed that interest rate deregulation led to significant 
decline in bank market values. Others have examined the impact of possible changes in prudential 
norms for loan classification on banks’ credit portfolio (Das and Ghosh, 2007).  
A second set of studies explore the impact of financial deregulation on alternate measures of bank 
performance. For instance, several studies investigate the determinants of bank profitability or net 
interest margins (Demirguc Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Demirguc Kunt et al., 2003; Maudos and Solis, 
2009), bank stability indicators (Ianotta et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009), These studies veer around the 
view that financial deregulation generally has a positive effect on performance.  
The study which comes closest to the spirit of the present analysis is IMF (2012). Employing cross-
national data on 36 countries for the period 2000-11, the analysis examined the impact of several 
macroprudential instruments on both financial and real variables.1 The results appear to suggest 
statistically significant effects for both capital requirements and reserve requirements on credit growth. 
In terms of real variables, the results point to the fact that limits on LTV ratio exerts a non-negligible 
impact on output growth. 
Although there are certain similarities between that study and the present one, there are also 
important differences. First, unlike the IMF (2013) study, the present article focuses on a single country. 
This enables us to bypass issues of data comparability that often plagues cross-country studies 
(Honohan, 2008). Second, the comparison of institutional and political characteristics across countries 
can be rendered difficult due to the diversity in their historical experiences, cultural norms and 
institutional contexts. Focusing on a single country enables to bypass the limitations of cross-country 
studies (Rodrik, 2005). Third, the set of macroprudential instruments considered across the two sets of 
studies is significantly different. And finally, we explore the differential impact of macroprudential 
variables across bank ownership, an aspect not addressed by IMF (2013). This paper seeks to fill the gap 
in the literature and to shed further light on the evidence in the context of various measures of 
macroprudential regulation and banking in India during 1992–2012. 
 
3.  The database and sample 
Bank-wise data on commercial banks spanning the period 1992 through 2012 are culled out from the 
various issues of Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India. This publication by the Indian central bank 
provides the annual audited data on the balance sheet and profit and loss accounts of individual banks. 
The financial year for banks runs from the first day of April of a particular year to the last day of March 
of the subsequent year. Accordingly, the year 1992 corresponds to the period 1991–92 (April–March) 
and so on, for the other years. The data has the advantage of being perfectly comparable across banks, 
                                                 
1 The macroprudential instruments considered were capital requirements, limits on LTV, cap on debt-to-income and reserve 
requirements.  
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with the central bank acting as the regulator of the financial system requires the financial entities to 
present their balance sheets in the same format and criteria.  
The sample comprises of all state-owned banks (SOBs), which account for around 75% of total banking 
assets, 20 domestic private banks (DPBs), including 5 de novo private banks (which became operational 
after the initiation of reforms), which account for around 15% of banking assets and 16 foreign banks 
(FBs), accounting for roughly 7% of total banking assets. The excluded private and foreign banks are 
those which have become operational only recently and therefore lack a consistent time series of 
relevant variables. The de novo private banks became operational only since 1996. As a result, the 
number of reporting banks witnessed a sharp increase thereafter. Subsequently, the banking industry 
also witnessed some consolidation, both domestic and internationally. We also include a dummy 
variable for take this aspect on board. As a result, we have an unbalanced panel, with a minimum of 58 
banks at the beginning of the sample to a maximum of 64 banks. Finally, the macroeconomic variables 
are obtained from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy.  
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1  Univariate tests 
 
Table 1 reports comparisons of various measures of performance, as indicated earlier. The results 
indicate a clear divergence across ownership. These differences in most cases appear to be 
economically important, as well. For example, the average NIM for FBs is 3.4%, which is significantly 
higher as compared to SOBs and DPBs. Return on asset displays the greatest variation, especially for 
SOBs. Their average RoA is 0.6%, which is around 50% lower than that obtaining for DPBs and roughly 
half as compared to FBs. All these differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
The results on Z-score and credit growth2 are no less striking.3 FBs have statistically significant lower Z-
score as well as credit growth as compared to other bank groups. To illustrate, credit growth for FBs is 
roughly 9%, which is significantly lower as compared to 14.3% growth obtaining for DPBs. Overall, the 
results in table 3 appear to suggest that FBs have the highest margins and profitability, although their 
stability and credit growth are the lowest across ownership.    
 Table 1: Univariate tests: Differences in performance across bank ownership 
Variable RoA NIM In (1+Z) Gr_Adv Banks 
SOB 0.006 (0.017) 0.031 (0.036) 1.462 (0.511) 0.105 (0.199) 28 
DPB 0.009 (0.007) 0.027 (0.008) 1.529 (0.453) 0.143 (0.178) 19 
FB 0.012 (0.028) 0.034 (0.017) 1.259 (0.451) 0.084 (0.203) 17 
t-test of difference      
SOB vs. DPB -3.634*** 3.157*** -2.092** -2.991***  
SOB vs. FB 3.637*** -2.190** 6.345*** 2.532***  
DPB vs. FB -2.057** -7.384*** -8.004*** 4.076***  
Standard deviation within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level, respectively 
                                                 
2
 To moderate the influence of outliers, the credit growth variable is calculated as in Dinc (2005).  
3
 Consistent with the literature, risk taking is measured by the Z-score, which is a proxy for insolvency risk (Boyd and Runkle, 
1993; Laeven and Levine, 2009). A higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable. Because the Z-score is highly 
skewed, we employ the natural logarithm of the Z-score, which is normally distributed (Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
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4.2 Multivariate regression 
We control for unaccounted factors in a multivariate regression framework. Akin to Demirguc Kunt and 
Huizinga (2000) and Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) and Micco et al. (2007), measures of performance 
are regressed on a set of controls (X) included with a lag to account for endogeneity. The regression 
specification for bank s at time t is specified according as: 
tststststts mergerdyODXPerf ,,3,21,, ]_['                                                                 (1) 
 In (1), Perf is the performance measure, which is regressed on a set of lagged bank-level controls (X) 
and ηt are year fixed effects. All expressions control for the impact of mergers (dy_merger). We run the 
regressions with and without the ownership dummy (OD) to ascertain its impact on bank performance. 
Finally, ν is the error term. 
We estimate the impact of explanatory variables on performance by fixed effects panel regressions. 
Throughout, inference is based on standard errors that are clustered at the bank level. 
The bank-specific variables include (log of) total assets (LTA), bank-wise asset share (SHTA) in a given 
year, demand deposits (DDEP) and fee income (NINT). Following Berger et al. (2005), we include both 
LTA and SHTA. Among the other variables, DDEP takes into account for banks’ funding structure (SOBs 
tend to rely more on retail deposits as compared to other bank groups) whereas NINT accounts for 
banks’ income diversification (foreign banks tend to rely more on non-interest income).  
 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
In Table 2, across the first two sets of specifications, the coefficient on demand deposits is significant 
and positive, suggesting that banks with greater retail dependence have higher profitability and 
margins. In the baseline specification, it is observed that a 10% increase in retail dependence improves 
RoA by nearly 0.3 percentage points. One reason for this could be the low (or, negligible) cost of such 
deposits, which enables banks to earn higher margins and profitability on such funds. Banks with higher 
fee incomes are able to generate higher profitability, as expected.  
Bigger banks appear to exhibit greater stability. These findings are consistent with Beck et al. (2009) 
who find that bank size exerts a positive impact on stability. Credit growth is slower for big banks, 
suggestive of the fact that smaller banks increase credit at a faster pace to gain market share. 
When we include bank ownership, it is observed that as compared to DPBs, FBs have lower credit 
growth and stability. The effect is quantitatively important, indicating that the average foreign bank has 
a credit growth that is 0.08% points lower as compared to an average domestic private bank. 
Considering that the average credit growth in the sample is 11%, this is a sizeable difference.  
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Table 2. Relative performance of banks  
Variables RoA NIM Ln (1+Z) Gr_Adv 
Intercept 0.014 
(0.010) 
0.009  
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
1.029 
(0.269)*** 
1.240  
(0.258)*** 
0.191 
(0.110)* 
0.245  
(0.176) 
LTA -0.002 
(0.001)* 
-0.001  
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.059  
(0.035)* 
0.056  
(0.034)* 
-0.014  
(0.008)* 
-0.038  
(0.018)** 
SHTA 0.019 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.043) 
-0.006 
(0.044) 
0.557 
(0.368) 
0.799 
(0.327)*** 
-0.136 
(0.183) 
-0.025 
(0.195) 
DDEP 0.033 
(0.010)*** 
0.031  
(0.009)*** 
0.021  
(0.022) 
0.025  
(0.020) 
0.740  
(0.467) 
0.774 
(0.461)* 
0.074 
(0.171) 
0.120  
(0.197) 
NINT 0.241 
(0.113)** 
0.239  
(0.118)** 
0.452 
(0.180)*** 
0.442 
(0.190)** 
-0.344 
(0.268) 
-0.201 
(0.154) 
-0.125 
(0.445) 
-0.405  
(0.303) 
d_merger 0.003 
(0.001)** 
0.003 
(0.001)** 
0.006  
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.096) 
0.020 
(0.095) 
0.034 
(0.047) 
0.028  
(0.044) 
SOB  -0.002  
(0.001)* 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
 -0.103 
(0.060)* 
 0.070  
(0.052) 
FB  -0.0007 
(0.002) 
 -0.007 
(0.002) 
 -0.220 
(0.061)*** 
 -0.078 
(0.023)*** 
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Period 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
N.Obs; Banks 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1280; 64 1243; 64 1243; 64 
R-squared 0.1527 0.1539 0.1736 0.1765 0.2283 0.2532 0.0364 0.0559 
Note: Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level, respectively 
 
4.4 The role of macroprudential regulation  
The previous discussion indicates that FBs display lower stability and exhibit lower credit growth as 
compared to DPBs. The analysis does not highlight how specific macroprudential measures impact bank 
performance. To investigate this further, we check whether macroprudential regulation affects the 
relationship between ownership and performance by estimating equations of the following form: 
tststts
tttstts
XGDPGRFB
PRUGDPGRSOBPerf
,1,21,
321,,
')(
)(





                                                                          (2) 
In (2), GDPGR measures the real GDP growth in year t, and PRU (PRU=CRAR, LOAN, PROV) is the 
particular macroprudential measure; the remaining variables are as defined in Eq. (1).  
Our main coefficient of interest is α3. The coefficient measures the impact of implementation of a given 
macroprudential measure on state-owned banks (the main effect of macroprudential norms is 
controlled through year effects). We control for the interaction between ownership and GDP growth, 
because state-owned and foreign banks might respond differently to the business cycle as compared to 
domestic private banks. This would not be a problem if the business cycles were uncorrelated with the 
prudential measures, although such a correlation cannot be ruled out (Micco et al., 2007).  
Table 3 reports the results for return on asset, interest margins, soundness and credit growth. Take for 
instance, Column 1. The results suggest that, as compared with DPBs, SOBs have higher profitability 
during periods of economic expansion although their profitability is reduced after imposition of capital 
adequacy norms. The impact of the macroprudential measure is economically meaningful, as well. To 
see this, consider the differential in profitability of the average SOB and the average DPB in a year in 
which real GDP grew by 6.7%, the average growth rate in the sample. Ignoring the impact of the 
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tightening of capital standards, the differential is equals to 0.011% points [=-0.019+0.067*(0.125)]. 
Taking on board the impact of capital adequacy norms, the point estimates of Col. 1 yield a difference 
of 0.023% points [=-0.019+0.067*(0.125)-0.012], an increase of over 100% with respect to the no-
capital imposition benchmark. In a similar fashion, in case of both loan classification and provisioning 
practices (Cols. 2 and 3), the difference in profitability works out to be 85% and 62%, respectively.  
Table 3. Regression result: Analysis of bank performance 
 Dep variable = RoA Dep variable = NIM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
SOB -0.019  
(0.004)*** 
-0.011  
(0.001)*** 
-0.017  
(0.003)*** 
-0.010  
(0.002)*** 
-0.011  
(0.003)*** 
-0.009  
(0.001)*** 
FB -0.005  
(0.007) 
-0.004  
(0.007) 
-0.004  
(0.007) 
0.013  
(0.005)*** 
0.014  
(0.005)*** 
0.014  
(0.005)*** 
SOB* GDPGR 0.125  
(0.024)*** 
0.129  
(0.031)*** 
0.134  
(0.023)*** 
0.110  
(0.053)** 
0.136  
(0.072)* 
0.117  
(0.052)** 
FB*GDPGR 0.064  
(0.089) 
0.063  
(0.089) 
0.063  
(0.090) 
-0.179  
(0.074)*** 
-0.181 
(0.074)*** 
-0.180  
(0.074)*** 
SOB*CRAR -0.012  
(0.002)*** 
  -0.012  
(0.002)*** 
  
SOB*PROV  -0.002  
(0.001)** 
  -0.005  
(0.002)** 
 
SOB*LOAN   -0.005  
(0.001)*** 
  -0.006  
(0.002)*** 
Period 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
N.Obs; Banks 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 1291; 64 
R
2
 0.1662 0.1585 0.1614 0.1899 0.1854 0.1876 
 Dep variable = Ln (1+Z) Dep variable = Gr_Advances 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
SOB -0.141  
(0.055)*** 
-0.117  
(0.059)* 
-0.124  
(0.056)** 
-0.059  
(0.025)** 
-0.061  
(0.026)** 
-0.057  
(0.029)* 
FB -0.401  
(0.129)*** 
-0.403  
(0.129)*** 
-0.407 
(0.129)*** 
-0.077  
(0.058) 
-0.076  
(0.059) 
-0.076  
(0.059) 
SOB* GDPGR -2.226  
(1.109)** 
-3.911  
(1.524)*** 
-2.639  
(1.537)* 
0.841  
(0.453)* 
0.856  
(0.659) 
1.072  
(0.683) 
FB* GDPGR 2.797  
(1.802) 
2.827  
(1.803) 
2.868  
(1.805) 
-0.032  
(0.889) 
-0.035  
(0.892) 
-0.039  
(0.891) 
SOB*CRAR 0.216  
(0.048)*** 
  -0.004  
(0.002)** 
  
SOB*PROV  0.212  
(0.045)*** 
  0.016  
(0.018) 
 
SOB*LOAN   -0.236  
(0.059)*** 
  0.011   
(0.022) 
Period 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-2012 
N.Obs; Banks 1280; 64 1280; 64 1280; 64 1243; 64 1243; 64 1243; 64 
R
2
 0.2597 0.2687 0.2701 0.0604 0.0582 0.0580 
Note: Standard errors (clustered by bank) are within brackets 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10% level, respectively 
 
Similar results are echoed when we focus on interest margins. More specifically, the evidence indicates 
that interest margins of SOBs tend to be higher during periods of economic expansion and lower after 
imposition of macroprudential norms. Again, the coefficient on the macroprudential dummy is quite 
large and indicates that the differential between the interest margin of state-owned and private banks 
more than quadruples after imposition of capital adequacy norms (assuming 6.7% GDP growth, the two 
values are -0.003 and -0.015). Similar, although of slightly lower order of magnitude, are in evidence 
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when the provisioning and loan classification norms are considered. This provides evidence that the 
macroprudential channel is at work: the decline in profitability is driven to an extent by the lower 
margins.  
Cols.(7) to (9) focus on bank soundness. The evidence indicates that the soundness of SOBs declines 
during periods of economic growth, although macroprudential norms exert a salutary impact. More 
specifically, capital adequacy and provisioning norms improve soundness, whereas loan classification 
norms lower it. The magnitude of the macroprudential effect in all cases is extremely large. In case of 
provisioning norms for example, the point estimates indicate that the differential between the 
soundness of SOBs and DPBs halves after imposition of such norms (with 6.7% GDP growth, the two 
values are -0.38 and -0.17).  
[Table 7 here] 
The final three columns focus on credit growth. In particular, we find that SOBs increase their loan 
growth after imposition of capital norms. In Col.10 for example, the differential between credit growth 
of SOBs and DPBs works out to be over 100% (the two values are equal to -0.003 and -0.007 
respectively, assuming 6.7% GDP growth).  
In other words, the evidence indicates that the state-owned banks are less profitable than private banks 
and the difference in performance is accentuated after imposition of macroprudential norms.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions  
Financial sector reforms in India, undertaken as part of the overall process of reforms since the early 
1990s, were aimed at improving the efficiency and productivity of the financial sector. While there have 
been several studies on bank performance, these papers do not pay adequate attention to the 
important policy dimensions of prudential deregulation and their impact on bank performance.  
In this context, the present study employs panel data techniques to examine the impact of three 
important macroprudential measures - capital adequacy norms, provisioning requirements and 
tightening of loan classification norms - on the performance of Indian banks since the 1990. We focus 
on four major firm characteristics: profitability, margins, soundness and credit growth. The analysis 
indicates that the state-owned banks are less profitable than private banks and the difference in 
performance is accentuated after imposition of macroprudential norms. These results are quite robust. 
It is apparent in simple univariate comparisons as well as in multivariate regressions that takes on board 
several control variables.  
Summing up, the balance of evidence indicates that different measures of macroprudential regulation 
exert differential impact on banks across ownership. It, therefore, appears important for policymakers 
to take a holistic view of all prudential measures and their potential impact on the banking system in 
order to avoid possible pitfalls.  
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